

# Spouse labor supply: fiscal incentive and income effect, evidence from French fully joint income tax system

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## Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to measure the labor supply elasticity with respect to income tax rates. A very complete data base of more than 500 000 observations a year is used. This data base is a large sample of the French income tax files. The case of spouses is studied by comparing - for very similar couples - the probability of the secondary earner to participate in the labor market depending on the other foyers incomes on the one hand and depending on the tax rate at which would be taxed the income of this work on the other hand. Results find labor market participation elasticity with respect to income tax rate equal to -0.05 and with respect to income equal to -0.21. That for, it is outlined that joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on the secondary earners participation. As secondary earners are mainly women in France, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation to the labor market. Moreover, differences are detailed. Different elasticities are measured for the different population categories. Two facts appear, they confirm each other partially. On the one hand, there is a difference between spouses more or less constrained to participate in the labor market. The more constrained ones present elasticities weaker than the less constrained ones. On the other hand, there is a major difference between the capital holders and the others. The capital holders' elasticity with respect to income tax rate is higher than their elasticity with respect to income. The opposite occurred for the other people.

**Key words:** Labor supply; Time allocation; Fiscal incidence.

**JEL classification:** H22; H31; J32.

## 1 Introduction

The aim of the present paper is to measure the labor supply elasticity of couple members with respect to income tax rates. More specifically, the case of secondary earners is pointed out with the hypothesis that they do not choose their working time but only their participation to labor market. With empirical

estimations upon a very large base of French income tax returns, secondary earner participation elasticities with respect to tax rate and couple wealth are estimated and compared for different kinds of couples.

There exist two main reasons to limit the study to the case of secondary earners. One is linked to the economic subject, the other to econometric needs. First, some characteristics of income tax schedules may mainly influence secondary earners labor supply. Couple joint income taxation may implies a very high tax rate on the secondary earner's potential wages, and therefore may be an incentive to give up working. Second, labor market is imperfect. Some workers may be very constraints on labor market, by financial needs or social pressure. Furthermore, there is quite no choice to really modify marginally one's working time. These two imperfections have a smaller impact on secondary earners because they have a real choice to participate or not because of the couple income due to primary earners. This choice is not only a marginal choice but may be a complete choice to participate to the labor market. Therefore, this choice is less constrained by working standards.

Estimating labor supply elasticities is a crucial point in optimal income tax schedule determining, and it can be done from different ways, finding different estimates. Blundell & MaCurdy (1999) define different wage elasticities. The most appropriate elasticity to describe response to one-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-tax wage is the intertemporal substitution elasticity corrected from future wage rate variations. The simple intertemporal substitution elasticity overestimates this key parameter. The static substitution elasticity is inferior to the intertemporal one without correction from future wage rate changes. Under some hypotheses - as the discount factor time the interest rate is equal to 1 - the static substitution elasticity is equal to the key parameter.

Feldstein (1995) uses panel data and the US 1986 tax reform to estimate an intertemporal taxable income elasticity, that he found high: higher than 1. Gruber & Saez (2002) also estimate intertemporal elasticity of taxable income. They find that labor supply elasticity with respect to tax rate is quite high for the very high income agents. However, they find that the income effect is low. Piketty (1999) finds lower elasticities for lower income agents, and explains these results by a substantial income effect. After a tax rate increase, the marginal rate diminishes the net of tax wage, and therefore the incentive to work. However, not only the marginal wage is diminished, and the agent may have to work more to compensate its wealth decrease. Saez (2003) tries to estimate the difference between taxable income elasticity and wage income elasticity. He uses 'bracket creep' variations and finds significant taxable income elasticities but insignificant and close to zero wage income elasticities. This can be due to labor market rigidities: workers (except for the very high income) do not have a real choice about their working time.

At that point, secondary earners may have more choice, and particularly the choice of participating to full time job market or to half time job market. Blundell et al. (1998) find for example a very high income effect for women with children, which should be for great part secondary earners. For a theoretical point of view, Kleven et al. (2006) study the optimal taxation of couple, using a specification where secondary earner choose only to participate or not, and not their working time. The model estimated in the present study is derivate from this one.

From an empirical point of view, Dagsvik et al. (1988), Bourguignon & Magnac (1990) and Blundell & Laisney (1998) estimate working hours supply elasticity, and not participation elasticity. From that hypothesis, Bourguignon & Magnac (1990) conclude that there is a lack of flexibility in work hours. Donni (2007), according to Donni (2003) theoretical results, keeps data about non participating secondary earners to estimate the household labor supply elasticities. However, the elasticities estimated deal with marginal working time variations. Piketty (1998) estimates the impact on secondary earner participation of different social gains, and particularly a parental allocation. He finds that allocations to non working women with children are very strong incentive for women with children to leave the labor market.

The present study focuses on the fiscal influence on secondary earner participation to the labor market. The point is to estimate secondary earner participation probability elasticities with respect to tax rate and income. The estimations use 'bracket creep' as source of variation. The estimates are made separately for different social categories of couples, and then compared. Thanks to the richness of the data base, it is possible to estimate the elasticities for a high number of different couple categories - actually, there is a division of couples between 3 000 categories. This allows avoiding some endogenous biases, and provides information on differences between different secondary earner elasticities.

On a global point of view, substantial elasticities are found. Participation elasticity with respect to the tax rate is found equal to -0.05, and participation elasticity with respect to other incomes of the household is found equal to -0.21. This means that an increase from 10% to 11% (a 10% increase) of the marginal tax rate for the secondary earner would induce that 1 working secondary earner out of 200 to leave the labor market. That for, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on the secondary earners participation. As secondary earners are mainly women in France, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation to the labor market.

Furthermore, elasticities of different kinds of households are compared. Two main results are found. First, households more constrained on labor market (low qualified, young, with children) are less elastic than other households. Second, capital owner households have a higher elasticity with respect to tax rate and a lower income effect than other households.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, explaining the parameters that are estimated in the following. Section 3 introduces to the French income tax schedule and presents the data used for the present study. Section 4 explains the estimation methodology and presents the results. Section 5 discusses the results and offers concluding remarks.

## 2 theoretical framework

Labor market is deeply imperfect. Two of the main imperfections on the supply side are some vital or social constrains on the one hand, and the loss of marginal variation decision on the other hand. Therefore, household labor supply models should take into account the existence of a primary and a secondary earner. Kleven et al. (2006) present a model where the primary earner works and chooses his working hours and

the secondary earner chooses to participate or not at a fixed working time. The specifications used in the present paper are similar to those of Kleven et al. (2006), with the decision of the secondary earner having no impact on the decision of the primary earner. The condition is then that the income tax schedule should be separable. However, if the income tax schedule is not separable from itself, household decision to work may consider it as separable. The primary earner works and the household considers this income as the reference income. Then, the decision for the secondary earner to work is taken depending on the returns of these potential earnings.

The model estimated in the present paper considers a household utility function  $U[C, L]$  depending positively on the household consumption and the secondary earner leisure. The influence of the secondary earner leisure on the household utility may either comes from the direct utility of leisure for the secondary earner as from the utility of the unwaged work made by the secondary earner during this “leisure” time. It may also correspond to consumption utility if the household has to pay wages for domestic services in case of secondary earner participation.

The reference situation is the secondary earner non participation. The secondary earner leisure is  $L_0$  and the household income by consumption unit is  $Y_0(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ , allowing the household to consume  $C_0(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ . The parameter  $\theta_1$  represents the observable characteristics of the household, which can be the age of both members of the couple, their qualification, their number of children... This parameter defines a mean income whose the household may pretend to. Similar households with respect to  $\theta_1$  may receive different exogenous shocks  $\theta_2$  on their income. Therefore, if the secondary earner does not participate, the couple utility depending on  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  is given by equation 1.

$$U_{\theta_1, \theta_3}[C_0(\theta_1, \theta_2), L_0] \tag{1}$$

Where  $\theta_3$  reflects the individual preferences of the household. This parameter  $\theta_3$  is supposed to be independent from  $\theta_2$ . It results actually that there is not a participation choice for a household at  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  given, but that there is a probability for the secondary earner to participate.

The secondary earner may work for wages  $W(\theta_1)$ , depending on the household characteristic parameter  $\theta_1$ . This dependence comes from an endogamous hypothesis. Moreover, it is assumed that the income shock  $\theta_2$  has no impact on the potential secondary earner wages. Therefore, if the secondary earner participates, the couple utility depending on  $\theta_1$ ,  $\theta_2$  and  $\theta_3$  is given by equation 2.

$$U_{\theta_1, \theta_3}[C_0(\theta_1, \theta_2) + \frac{W(\theta_1)T - I[W(\theta_1)T, \theta_1, \theta_2]}{P}, L_0 - T] \tag{2}$$


Where  $T$  is the working time,  $P$  is a price index and  $I[W(\theta_1)T, \theta_1, \theta_2]$  is the income tax paid by the household on the secondary earner wages. This income tax depends on the secondary earner wages  $W(\theta_1)$ , but also on the other household income - actually  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_2$  - because a joint income tax is studied.

To present the result on a graph, another hypothesis is made: the utility function is assumed to be separable. Two functions are then derivated from the utility function, depending on  $\theta_1$ ,  $\theta_2$ ,  $\theta_3$  and the

working time  $t$  of the secondary earner. The first function  $f_{\theta_1, \theta_3}(t, \theta_2)$  gives the utility increase due to consumption increase because of the secondary earner work. This function is increasing and concave with respect to the secondary earner working time  $t$  for two reasons: first, the utility function is assumed to be concave with respect to the consumption and second, the income tax schedule is assumed to be with increasing marginal rates. This function  $f$  is decreasing with respect to the income shock  $\theta_2$  for two reasons: first, the utility function is concave with respect to household consumption, which means that same net of tax secondary earner wages generate less additional utility when the rest of household income  $Y_0$  is higher. Second, the income tax schedule is joint and with increasing marginal rates. Therefore, when  $\theta_2$  is higher, the tax rate on secondary earner wages is higher, and the net of tax income from the secondary earner work is lower.

The second function  $g_{\theta_1, \theta_3}(t)$  gives the utility decrease due to leisure loss when the secondary earner works a time  $t$ . This function is assumed to be increasing and convex with respect to  $t$ . Figure 1 represents functions  $f$  and  $g$  for  $\theta_1$  and  $\theta_3$  fixed, and for two different values of the shock  $\theta_2$ : a value  $\bar{\theta}_2 = h$  for a high income shock and a value  $\underline{\theta}_2 = l$  for a low shock.

Figure 1: Spouse decision to work depending on other income shock



Note: This figure presents the participating choice, depending on the income shock  $\theta_2$  (shock on the couple income less the potential spouse wage).  $T^*$  is the legal work time, the only work time possible for the spouse.

According to the lack of flexibility in work hours, the only decision that can be taken by the secondary earner is to work a time  $T^*$  or not to participate to the labor market. In figure 1, the secondary earner participates when the other income of the household has received a low shock  $\underline{\theta}_2$  and does not participate when it has received a high shock  $\bar{\theta}_2$ .

According to  $\theta_3$  exogenous distribution, the income shock  $\theta_2$  should impact the probability for the secondary earner of a  $\theta_1$  household to participate to the labor market. The aim of the present study is to


estimate the impact on the secondary earner participation rate of the  $\theta_2$  shock on the per consumption unit household income.

### 3 Data

The present study uses French data to estimate the elasticity of the secondary earner participation to labor market with respect to tax rate and household income. For that doing, a sample for 2005 of French income tax returns is used. This sample contains more than 500 000 observations representing the about 34 millions of French income tax returns. Therefore, the study uses more than 270 000 joint returns, as a sample of the 13 millions couples declaring jointly. The variables are all the information provided by households in their income tax return, except for the names and addresses.

In the French income tax return, the primary or secondary earner status is chosen by the couple. However, primary earners are mainly husbands whereas wives are mainly secondary earners. This auto-declaration of “declaring people” or “spouse” is meaningful. For the 2005 returns studied in the present papers, more than 77% of the couples were with primary earner wages higher than secondary earner’s, and among the other 23%, there is some couples with a retired primary earner. Similarly, there were only 250 000 spouses participating as the declared primary earner does not, among more than 12 millions couples.

The French income tax schedule provides a good source of estimation for secondary earner participation elasticity. It is progressive and married people may declare jointly. Concerning the progressive tax schedule, figure 2 presents the French income tax schedule for a single without any child.



Note: This figure presents the French income tax schedule. The mean rate and the global tax are calculated for a single without children nor fiscal deduction.

Theoretical marginal rates appear to be high, but the real marginal rates are much lower. As an

example, 2005 French income tax collected less than 3% of the annual GDP, as the same percentage is about 10% for most the other OECD countries. This high theoretical rates operate on a base substantially lower than the real incomes<sup>1</sup>. However, if the facial values of these rates are not valid, brackets exist. Therefore, this schedule defines a convex function  $f$  that gives the tax amount  $I$  from the income  $Y$  ( $T = f(Y)$ ). The present paper uses the convexity of this function - and the non continuity of its derivative - to estimate the spouse participation elasticity.

Furthermore, married and PACSed<sup>2</sup> may declare jointly. To calculate the joint income tax, a household should be attributed a number of *parts*  $p$ , according to table 1.

Table 1: Number of *parts* for a declarant

Couple situation	Number of people in charge				
	0	1	2	3	suppl.
Couple (joint declaration)	2 parts	2,5 p.	3 p.	4 p.	+1 p.
Couple (separated declaration)	1 p.	1,5 p.	2 p.	3 p.	+1 p.
Single	1 p.	2 p.	2,5 p.	3 p.	+1 p.
Widow	1 p.	2,5 p.	3 p.	4 p.	+1 p.

The number of *parts* due to couple is called the *conjugal quotient*, and the number of *parts* due to people in charge is called *family quotient*. The household income tax is calculated as  $I_j = pf(\frac{Y}{p})$ , that is inferior to  $f(Y)$  because  $f$  is convex. The tax diminish due to *conjugal quotient* is unbounded whereas the tax diminish due to *family quotient* is bounded.

For a given *family quotient*, the *conjugal quotient* provides an income tax diminish increasing with respect to the difference between the earner's incomes. Therefore, the tax diminish is mainly decreasing with respect to the secondary earner wages, whose first euro may be taxed at a quite high marginal rate. This tax schedule may be a negative incentive for the secondary earner to participate.


However, there exist a lot of other incentives to participate or not to participate to the labor supply. Figure 3 presents four of the main determinants for secondary earner participation.

Concerning the number of children (e.g. figure 3a), there appears no difference between the participation of secondary earners with 1 and 2 children. After the third child, the participation ratio decrease strongly. Angrist & Evans (1998) demonstrate that this diminish is not only due to selection effects. Using the fact of having two first children of same sex as instrumental variable, they demonstrate that without other incidences, having three or more children constraints the women participation to labor market. In addition, the low participation rate for couple without any child in charge is due to three causes. First, there are some young couples whose secondary earner is still a student. Second, there are some old couples,

<sup>1</sup>For example, they operate on 72% of the wages lower than 120 000 euros, and on 50% of dividend income.

<sup>2</sup>PACS is a couple contract with some difference with marriage (may be contracted between homosexual partners), that open right to joint income tax declaration.

Figure 3: Determinants for second earner participation



whose children are not in charge any more, and who are retired. Third, other age couples without children may more easily stay out of the labor market because they have less responsibility.

Concerning figure 3b, the curve presents two parts. First, the secondary earner participation rate is increasing with respect to the income tax bracket. An explaining way is endogamy. A low couple tax bracket means that the primary earner wages are low, and therefore that its qualification may be low. In that case, the probability for the secondary earner to be also low qualified is substantial. The second part of the curve is slowly decreasing. This may reflect the large scale impact of income effect. Secondary earners married to a very rich primary earner have less necessity than other to work.

Figure 3c presents the link between age and participation. The clearer effect is retirement that begins just before age of 60. After 60, it is quite the case for all secondary earners. There is a very slow increase over the activity ages. Younger than 30 year old secondary earners are a little less participating than older ones. It can be caused by the existence of student secondary earners.

The last of these four figures, figure 3d, presents the impact of capital owning on participation. Capital owners participate less than other people. The reason is mainly that they do not need to participate to earn income. Furthermore, it seems that the difference is larger concerning real estate than movable capital. The reason may be due to a composition effect. Old people are more likely to own real estate than movable capital.

Table 2: Couple categorization

Parameters	Nb.	categories
Children...	3	0, 1 or 2, $\geq 3$
Child younger than 3	2	yes, no
Secondary earner age	5	$\leq 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, > 60$
Primary earner age	5	$\leq 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, > 60$
Primary earner wage	5	$\leq 0.5 \text{ SMIC}, 0.5-1, 1-2, 2-4, > 4 \text{ SMIC}$
Movable capital	2	yes, no
Real estate incomes	2	0, $< 0.5 \text{ SMIC}, > 0.5 \text{ SMIC}$

Note: SMIC is the French minimum wage, the value of a year full time job is used as income reference.

The point of the empirical study is to capture only the fiscal incidence on secondary earner participation to labor market, and not the incidences presented in figure 3. The empirical strategy is then to compare couples identical with respect to these determinants of spouse labor supply. According to the theoretical framework, the point is to compare only couples whose parameter  $\theta_1$  is the same. Therefore, categories are built to compare only identical couples, and estimations are done only within these categories. Table 2 presents the  $\theta_1$  parameter calibration that divided the sample between 3 000 household categories.

## 4 Empirical result

In the fourth section, estimations are presented. There are two kinds of estimations aiming to catch two different effects. In the first subsection, the influence of the income shock  $\theta_2$  is globally estimated for different couple categories. The point is to understand which kind of spouse has high or low participation elasticity. The second subsection tries to differentiate between an income effect and a tax rate effect. The point is to understand the main participation motivation for the different couple categories.

### 4.1 Global estimation

The first subsection tries to understand globally the impact of primary earner income shocks  $\theta_2$  on the probability  $\pi$  of the secondary earner participation to the labor market. The regression, presented by equation (3), is a logit regression of the secondary earner participation rate on the yearly income - excepted secondary earner wages - by consumption unit (this income is noted  $Y_{cu}$  and catches the  $\theta_2$  impact),

controlled by the couple category ( $\theta_1$ ) defined in table 2.

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = a + b \ln(Y_{cu}) + \sum_{\theta_1} c_{\theta_1} \mathbf{1}_{\theta_1} + u_i \quad (3)$$

With the results of this regression, and particularly the parameters  $b$  and  $\pi$ , the secondary earner participation elasticity may be calculated following equation (4).

$$\epsilon^\pi = \frac{Y_{cu}}{\pi} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Y_{cu}} = b(1-\pi) \quad (4)$$

This regression is first implemented on the whole sample. Following, it is implemented on different subsamples. Each subsample represents a different couple category. Table 3 presents the results for child and age categorizations. Table 4 presents the results for income categorizations.

First of all, it appears that the spouse participation elasticity is high and quite all the results are very significant (quite all significant at the level of 1%). The mean elasticity is found equal to -0.13, which is substantially high. For an example, the mean participation ration being about 48%, if the income by consumption unit of 160 couples increases from 1500 to 1650 euros monthly - that is a 10% increase - 1 spouse among the 77 that participate to the labor market stops participating.

The point of the present study is to compare secondary earner participation elasticity between different couple categories. Because the standard errors are quite all very small, not only the elasticity estimates are significant, but the differences between this estimates are also significant. The main interpreting way is about constraints on the labour market. The idea is that because of individual reasons, some spouses are forced to participate or not to participate. Therefore, their participation does not depend (or suffer a weak dependence) on marginal variations of their household income.

The first constraint appearing is the existence of children in charge. Having children in charge gives responsibility and may be an incentive for the secondary earner to participate. Therefore, secondary earners without any child in charge have a high elasticity. This is not due only to composition effect, because young couples (mostly without children) and old couples (with children not in charge anymore) have very low elasticities. Concerning, the third and more children category, the results may be explained by the Angrist & Evans (1998) demonstration that third child presents a real constraint on wives participation to labor market. Indeed, secondary earners with three children or more have an even less elasticity than those with one or two children. Furthermore, having a young baby seems to have an even stronger effect than having more than three children. Spouses with less than three year old children have a higher participation rate and a lower elasticity than spouses with more than three children.

Concerning the differentiation with ages, two parameters are used: the secondary or the primary earner age. For the categories under 60 year old, the results are quite the same for the two parameter differentiation. The secondary earner participation elasticity is increasing with respect to the couple age. The constraint here is due to the fact that young people do not work only to earn money, but also work to prepare the rest of their career. The decision to work is then less strongly linked with the house-

Table 3: Spouse participation elasticity, child and age differentiation

	Participation ratio	Income <i>b</i>	Elasticity
<b>Overall</b>	47,9 %	-0,246 (0,001)	<b>-0,13</b> (0,00)
<b>Children in charge</b>			
No child	31,2 %	-0,360 (0,002)	<b>-0,25</b> (0,00)
1 or 2 children	70,3 %	-0,214 (0,001)	<b>-0,06</b> (0,00)
More than 3 children	53,2 %	-0,021 (0,003)	<b>-0,01</b> (0,00)
<b>Child younger than 3</b>			
No	45,6 %	-0,286 (0,001)	<b>-0,16</b> (0,00)
Yes	63,9 %	0,003 (0,003)	<b>-0,00</b> (0,00)
<b>Secondary earner age</b>			
Less than 30	67,2 %	0,044 (0,005)	<b>0,01</b> (0,00)
Between 30 and 40	69,6 %	-0,101 (0,002)	<b>-0,03</b> (0,00)
Between 40 and 50	69,7 %	-0,242 (0,002)	<b>-0,07</b> (0,00)
Between 50 and 60	55,1 %	-0,347 (0,002)	<b>-0,16</b> (0,00)
More than 60	5,4 %	-0,017 (0,000)	<b>-0,02</b> (0,00)
<b>Primary earner age</b>			
Less than 30	72,9 %	-0,033 (0,006)	<b>-0,01</b> (0,00)
Between 30 and 40	70,7 %	-0,093 (0,003)	<b>-0,03</b> (0,00)
Between 40 and 50	69,6 %	-0,257 (0,002)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,00)
Between 50 and 60	60,0 %	-0,334 (0,002)	<b>-0,13</b> (0,00)
More than 60	11,9 %	-0,247 (0,000)	<b>-0,22</b> (0,00)

Notes: *b* is the coefficient out of regression (3). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (4).

Table 4: Spouse participation elasticity, income differentiation

	Participation ratio	Income $b$	Elasticity
<b>Primary earner wages</b>			
< 6 871	23,4 %	-0,124 (0,001)	<b>-0,09</b> (0,0)
< 13 742	63,1 %	-0,480 (0,006)	<b>-0,18</b> (0,00)
< 27 485	75,0 %	-0,925 (0,004)	<b>-0,23</b> (0,00)
< 59 970	72,3 %	-1,157 (0,005)	<b>-0,32</b> (0,00)
> 59 970	53,6 %	-0,409 (0,007)	<b>-0,19</b> (0,00)
<b>Household incomes</b>			
< 8 000	51,6 %	0,157 (0,002)	<b>0,08</b> (0,00)
< 12 000	59,0 %	-0,579 (0,015)	<b>-0,24</b> (0,01)
< 20 000	47,3 %	-1,359 (0,011)	<b>-0,72</b> (0,01)
< 50 000	34,0 %	-1,202 (0,008)	<b>-0,79</b> (0,01)
< 100 000	33,0 %	-0,227 (0,025)	<b>-0,15</b> (0,02)
< 250 000	37,0 %	0,048 (0,037)	<b>0,03</b> (0,02)
< 1 000 000	39,7 %	0,071 (0,056)	<b>0,04</b> (0,03)
> 1 000 000	40,1 %	-0,002 (0,106)	<b>-0,00</b> (0,06)
<b>Movable capital</b>			
No income	50,7 %	-0,158 (0,002)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,00)
Income	42,7 %	-0,372 (0,002)	<b>-0,21</b> (0,00)
<b>Real estate</b>			
No income	49,8 %	-0,242 (0,001)	<b>-0,12</b> (0,00)
Income	37,9 %	-0,264 (0,003)	<b>-0,16</b> (0,00)

Notes:  $b$  is the coefficient out of regression (3). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (4).

hold budgetary constraint. However, there exists a difference between the two parameter categorizations concerning the more than 60 year old. The more than 60 year old secondary earners do not participate anymore, and have therefore very low participation elasticity. Though, among the spouses of more than 60 year old primary earners, there is some younger than 60 year old people. These secondary earners have very high participation elasticity with respect to their household income - high enough to compensate the other secondary earner low elasticity - because their retirement depends quite only on the income they would have during the rest of their lives.

The elasticity is found first increasing, then decreasing with respect to the primary earner wages and the household income. The increasing part is intuitive, and may be explained by two arguments. First, because of endogamy, spouses of primary earners with low wages have a higher probability to suffer classical unemployment. They are therefore constrained in the labor market and have quite no participation choice. Second, secondary earners whose household is less budgetary constrained are freer to choose whether or not they will participate.

Concerning capital owning, it appears that capital owners have higher elasticity than others. However, there may be many reasons and the second subsection, with tax rate effect and income effect differentiation, gives more information on that subject.

## 4.2 Tax incidence and income effect

To identify the real causes of secondary participation, this subsection tries to determinate two effects in the participation elasticity: the tax rate effect and the income effect. This is possible because of two French income tax schedule properties. First, there exist tax deductions that partly disconnect household income from household marginal tax rate. Second, there are discontinuities in marginal tax rates whereas household income is continuous. The estimations take two steps. The first step is the secondary earner potential wages estimation. It is done according to the regression (5).

$$\ln(W_S) = a + b \ln(W_P) + c \ln(Y_{RE}) + d \ln(Y_{Mov}) + \sum_{i,j} e_{i,j} \mathbf{1}_{[ages=i,j]} + u \quad (5)$$

Where  $W_S$  are the secondary earner wages,  $W_P$  the primary earner wages,  $Y_{RE}$  the household income from real estate and  $Y_{Mov}$  the household income from movable capital. This regression gives us the potential wages  $W_S^p$  for each secondary earner. Two income taxes for each household are then calculated, taking into account all the income tax deduction, reduction... The first is the income tax  $I_0$  that would pay the household if the secondary earner does not participate. The second is the income tax  $I_1$  that would pay the household if the secondary earner participates and earns  $W_S^p$ . Following, the Secondary earner wage tax rate is calculated as  $\tau = \frac{I_1 - I_0}{W_S^p}$ .

Then, the second step consists in the logit regression of the participation rate with respect to both the secondary earner potential wage tax rate  $\tau$  and the household other income  $Y_{cu}$  by consumption unit, as presented by equation (6).

$$\ln\left(\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}\right) = \alpha + \beta \ln(\tau) + \gamma \ln(Y_{uc}) + \delta \ln(\tau) * \ln(Y_{uc}) + \sum_{\theta_1} \epsilon_{\theta_1} \mathbf{1}_{\theta_1} + u_i \quad (6)$$

From this regression, the tax rate elasticity and the income elasticity of secondary earner participation to labor market may be calculated, as presented by equations (7) and (8).

$$\epsilon_{\tau}^{\pi} = \frac{\tau}{\pi} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \tau} = (\beta + \ln(Y_{uc}) \delta) (1 - \pi) \quad (7)$$

$$\epsilon_{Y_{uc}}^{\pi} = \frac{Y_{uc}}{\pi} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Y_{uc}} = (\gamma + \ln(\tau) \delta) (1 - \pi) \quad (8)$$

This estimation process is first implemented on the whole sample. Then, it is implemented on different subsamples, representing different couple categories. Table 5 presents the results for child and age categorizations. Table 6 presents the results for income categorizations.

First of all, it can be noticed that the income effect seems to be higher with the present specification. The previous estimation strategy considers only the before tax income, and therefore underestimates the income effect. However, the previous interpretations do not take into account the elasticity values themselves, but the elasticity differences between different couple categories.

The previous subsection says that the mean income effect is high, it appears now that the mean tax rate effect is also substantial: -0.05. For an example, the mean participation ratio being about 48%, if the marginal income tax rate increases from 10% to 11% - that is a 10% increase - for 400 couples, 1 spouse among the 192 that participate to the labor market stops participating.

Despite this importance of the participation elasticity with respect to marginal tax rate, its value is quite always lower than the participation elasticity with respect to income. Furthermore, concerning children and age categorizations, these two elasticities evolve the same way as the general elasticity studied in the previous subsection. The only difference appears for the more than 60 year old categories. For the more than 60 year old secondary earners, the income effect goes down, whereas the tax rate effect stays at a medium level. For the spouses of more than 60 year old primary earners, the tax rate effect disappears whereas the income effect takes off. This confirms the hypothesis of high elasticity because of retirement ease reasons. The main incentive for a less than 60 year old secondary earner to follow his more than 60 year old spouse in retirement is the income that the household would earn if the secondary earner retires.

Concerning the wage and income categorizations, it appears in the previous subsection that elasticity is increasing then decreasing. For the increasing part, the reason of this variation is mainly the income effect, which attains -1 for the couples yearly earning between 12 000 and 50 000 euros by consumption unit. Following, the income effect decreases for richer households. However, it seems that the tax rate effect increases when the global elasticity decreases. This result is not very significant: the tax rate elasticity parameter is at least 10% significant for the primary earner earning more than 60 000 euros yearly and the standard errors for the richest households are very high.

Table 5: Spouse participation elasticities, child and age differentiation

	Participation ratio	Tax rate $\beta$	Income $\gamma$	Crossed $\delta$	<b>Tax rate elasticity</b>	<b>Income elasticity</b>
<b>Overall</b>	47,9 %	1,642 (0,010)	-0,876 (0,003)	-0,185 (0,001)	<b>-0,05</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,21</b> (0,00)
<b>Children in charge</b>						
No child	31,2 %	1,673 (0,014)	-0,929 (0,005)	-0,193 (0,002)	<b>-0,12</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,33</b> (0,00)
1 or 2 children	70,3 %	1,828 (0,016)	-0,846 (0,005)	-0,211 (0,002)	<b>-0,04</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,00)
More than 3 children	53,2 %	1,548 (0,035)	-0,672 (0,009)	-0,166 (0,004)	<b>0,02</b> (0,03)	<b>-0,07</b> (0,01)
<b>Children younger than 3</b>						
No	45,6 %	1,687 (0,010)	-0,895 (0,003)	-0,194 (0,001)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,23</b> (0,00)
Yes	63,9 %	1,293 (0,033)	-0,578 (0,010)	-0,134 (0,004)	<b>0,02</b> (0,02)	<b>-0,07</b> (0,01)
<b>Secondary earner age</b>						
Less than 30	67,2 %	0,439 (0,052)	-0,313 (0,019)	-0,050 (0,006)	<b>0,00</b> (0,03)	<b>-0,05</b> (0,01)
Between 30 and 40	69,6 %	1,518 (0,024)	-0,801 (0,007)	-0,166 (0,003)	<b>0,00</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,10</b> (0,00)
Between 40 and 50	69,7 %	1,784 (0,018)	-0,837 (0,006)	-0,208 (0,002)	<b>-0,05</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,09</b> (0,00)
Between 50 and 60	55,1 %	1,967 (0,015)	-1,030 (0,005)	-0,215 (0,002)	<b>-0,04</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,24</b> (0,00)
More than 60	5,4 %	-0,026 (0,000)	-0,012 (0,000)	-0,001 (0,000)	<b>-0,03</b> (0,00)	<b>-0,01</b> (0,00)
<b>Primary earner age</b>						
Less than 30	72,9 %	-0,193 (0,080)	-0,849 (0,030)	0,025 (0,009)	<b>0,01</b> (0,04)	<b>-0,15</b> (0,02)
Between 30 and 40	70,7 %	1,444 (0,026)	-0,809 (0,008)	-0,156 (0,003)	<b>0,00</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,11</b> (0,01)
Between 40 and 50	69,6 %	1,680 (0,020)	-0,855 (0,006)	-0,190 (0,002)	<b>-0,03</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,11</b> (0,00)
Between 50 and 60	60,0 %	1,832 (0,015)	-0,966 (0,005)	-0,210 (0,002)	<b>-0,07</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,18</b> (0,00)
More than 60	11,9 %	0,798 (0,000)	-0,551 (0,000)	-0,076 (0,000)	<b>0,06</b> (0,00)	<b>-0,33</b> (0,00)

Notes:  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  are the coefficients out of regression (6). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (7) and (8).

Table 6: Spouse participation elasticities, income differentiation

	Participation ratio	Tax rate $\beta$	Income $\gamma$	Crossed $\delta$	Tax rate elasticity	Income elasticity
<b>Primary earner wages</b>						
< 6 871	23,4 %	0,966 (0,011)	-0,483 (0,004)	-0,104 (0,001)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,17</b> (0,00)
< 13 742	63,1 %	3,643 (0,050)	-1,541 (0,015)	-0,420 (0,006)	<b>-0,04</b> (0,03)	<b>-0,06</b> (0,01)
< 27 485	75,0 %	6,039 (0,045)	-2,536 (0,011)	-0,655 (0,005)	<b>-0,01</b> (0,02)	<b>-0,18</b> (0,01)
< 59 970	72,3 %	0,201 (0,095)	-1,190 (0,016)	-0,024 (0,010)	<b>-0,01</b> (0,05)	<b>-0,32</b> (0,01)
> 59 970	53,6 %	0,706 (0,273)	-0,364 (0,031)	-0,132 (0,026)	<b>-0,33</b> (0,20)	<b>-0,08</b> (0,03)
<b>Household income</b>						
< 8 000	51,6 %	-0,436 (0,026)	0,383 (0,013)	0,055 (0,003)	<b>0,01</b> (0,02)	<b>0,08</b> (0,01)
< 12 000	59,0 %	5,598 (0,306)	-2,243 (0,097)	-0,620 (0,033)	<b>-0,04</b> (0,21)	<b>-0,19</b> (0,07)
< 20 000	47,3 %	-6,494 (0,322)	-0,136 (0,075)	0,713 (0,034)	<b>0,20</b> (0,25)	<b>-0,91</b> (0,07)
< 50 000	34,0 %	-9,084 (0,287)	0,033 (0,046)	0,918 (0,028)	<b>0,20</b> (0,24)	<b>-1,02</b> (0,05)
< 100 000	33,0 %	19,008 (1,459)	-2,142 (0,156)	-1,759 (0,132)	<b>-0,32</b> (1,25)	<b>0,00</b> (0,17)
< 250 000	37,0 %	-1,706 (2,291)	0,122 (0,215)	0,094 (0,192)	<b>-0,37</b> (1,89)	<b>0,01</b> (0,23)
< 1 000 000	39,7 %	-1,852 (2,866)	0,168 (0,257)	0,101 (0,222)	<b>-0,33</b> (2,31)	<b>0,03</b> (0,27)
> 1 000 000	40,1 %	-7,764 (5,707)	0,525 (0,448)	0,517 (0,388)	<b>-0,17</b> (4,56)	<b>-0,06</b> (0,48)
<b>Movable capital</b>						
No income	50,7 %	2,427 (0,014)	-1,243 (0,005)	-0,263 (0,002)	<b>0,00</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,26</b> (0,00)
Income	42,7 %	0,900 (0,014)	-0,538 (0,004)	-0,124 (0,002)	<b>-0,18</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,15</b> (0,00)
<b>Real estate</b>						
No income	49,8 %	2,101 (0,012)	-1,121 (0,004)	-0,232 (0,001)	<b>-0,05</b> (0,01)	<b>-0,26</b> (0,00)
Income	37,9 %	1,191 (0,025)	-0,483 (0,006)	-0,148 (0,003)	<b>-0,17</b> (0,02)	<b>-0,11</b> (0,01)

Notes:  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  are the coefficients out of regression (6). Elasticities are calculated with respect to (7) and (8).

The elasticity crossing is significant for the capital owning categorizations. The capital owners have higher tax rate elasticity and lower income elasticity than capital non owners. This crossing occurs both for movable capital owning and real estate owning. There are two ways of understanding this phenomenon. The first interpretation is that richest household budget constraint is not tightening at all. Therefore, income effect is weak. At the opposite, they make the participation depends on what the secondary earner may earn, and the elasticity with respect to income tax rate is high.

The other way of understanding the elasticity crossing is to have an intertemporal interpretation. This is not an interpretation opposed to the previous one, but a complementary interpretation. Richest households and capital owners have a longer run intertemporal optimization of their decisions (or richness and capital allow their owners to optimize intertemporally their decisions). For these households, an income shock is smoothed all along the life cycle and has therefore a little impact on their labor market participation decisions.

## 5 Conclusions

The present study points out the impact of household income and income tax rates on the secondary earner participation to the labor market. That for, it outlines that joint income tax schedules may have a negative impact on the secondary earners participation. As secondary earners are mainly women in France, joint income tax schedules have a negative impact on women participation to the labor market.

This negative impact occurs through two different ways. First, joint income tax schedules provide income tax diminish to households. Therefore, they are richer, which is an incentive not to participate for the secondary earner. This income effect is particularly effective for middle class households. Second, joint income tax schedules make the tax rate higher for secondary earner wages. This is also an incentive not to participate for the secondary earner. This tax rate effect is particularly effective for higher class households. Lower class households are little impacted by these two effects, because they are more constrained on the labor market from a demand point of view.

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